Indonesia’s Democratic Progress


Partyforumseasia: A nation with over 190 million eligible voters is preparing for the presidential and legislative elections on 17 April in an increasingly feverish atmosphere. The presidential contenders, incumbent President Joko Widodo or Jokowi and his narrowly defeated challenger from five years ago, former general Prabowo Subianto, have used strategically chosen vice-presidential candidates and met in a series of public debates without clear winners. But Jokowi is still leading in the polls, as usual with a shrinking margin over Prabowo to keep the race exciting for the last days of campaigning.

In the huge Indonesian archipelago with more than 17.000 islands, over 300 ethnic groups, and very different levels of development and modernization, the organizational challenges of nationwide elections are already immense. But the young Indonesian democracy has so far shown quite a decent outcome, despite many flaws and open flanks. One is the ubiquitous vote-buying, which is also rampant in most countries in Southeast Asia. Because of a major 170 m US$ financial scandal with the introduction of identity cards, for which former house speaker Setya Novanto is serving 15 years in jail, several million voters without the ID card may be excluded from voting. Novanto was also a chairman of the Golkar party. Recently another Golkar parliamentarian, Bowo Sidik Pangarso, was caught with thousands of envelopes filled with cash in different denominations. At least a third of the voters have received cash for votes in the past, and according to polls, most voters accept that as normal, while for the many poor Indonesians some election cash is most welcome anyway. And the thumb rule is evident: Poor candidates never win a mandate,

The Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), though, is trying to stem the tide. A poster is urging the voters not to accept money: “Berani tolak gratifikasi” or “dare to refuse gratifications”. It may not be more than a starting point for a future change in election culture. The financial appetite of the political parties is an indicator that the candidates are still relying on cash handouts and other donations to their constituencies in the form of funds for mosques and sports facilities and the like. This is why, before the next president is confirmed, the horse trading for future coalitions and cabinet posts is already in full swing. Talking to journalists, Prabowo’s brother, Hashim Djojohadikusumo, revealed that in case of their victory, they would give seven ministerial posts to the National Mandate Party (PAN), and six to the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), two important members of their campaign coalition. Ministerial posts are the key to the huge number of development and infrastructure projects which serve as cash cows for parties and members of parliament to recoup the inevitable campaign costs. The skimming of these projects at a rate of between 10 and 30 percent is called “pencaloan anggaran” or “budget scalping“.

Another development looks more promising for Indonesia’s democratic progress. Among the 8000 odd candidates for the 575 seats in parliament are no less than 3,200 or roughly 40% women. The parties are forced by law to field at least 30% female candidates, but the numbers are going up. In the outgoing house, 17% of the MPs are female, so it will be interesting to see the outcome this year. The increasingly conservative mood in predominantly Muslim Indonesia is not really conducive for female careers in politics and business. But many younger women are just running with a scarf and all. Religious credentials play a strong role in this election. This is why incumbent presidential candidate Joko Widodo has chosen a leading Muslim cleric as his running mate.

For an overview of money politics in Southeast Asia see: ISBN: 978-981-3230-73-6
Cover - Copy

“Who owns Jokowi?” or Political Funding in Indonesia


Partyforumseasia: In “Indonesia”, no. 96, October 2013, pp. 1-121, the Cornell Southeast Asia Program focuses on the political science debates about Indonesia’s political funding in the democratic era. The volume contains five essays by prominent researchers, namely Jeffrey A. Winters, Vedi R. Hadiz and Richard Robison, R. William Liddle, Thomas B. Pepinsky, and Edward Aspinall. Jokowi
Three of them are working on the importance – and problem – of oligarchic influence on the politics of Indonesia. Hadiz, Robison, and Winters share the concept that material resources as a form of both economic and political power count most in Indonesia’s politics. The breathtaking speed with which the well-oiled and well-funded machinery of candidate Prabowo managed to reduce the twenty odd percent lead in most opinion polls of rival Jokowi during only some weeks of campaigning in June and July this year seems to support the theory. And Prabowo, his billionaire brother Hashim Djojokusumo, Golkar’s chairman Aburizal Bakrie and other allies and supporters must have been of the same opinion. Obviously they did not expect that Jokowi could win with a clear majority of over six per cent or eight million votes, which seduced Prabowo to jeopardize a lot of his credibility by not accepting the results and being seen as a bad loser.
Winters, Hadiz and Robison come to the conclusion that only a revolutionary degree of political change could disrupt the nexus between wealth and political power. Liddle, Pepinsky, and Aspinall, on the other hand, challenge the oligarchy paradigm and focus on other and new political actors with mobilization power beside the remaining power brokers from the old Suharto “New Order”. Published in October 2013 and irrespective of their competing hypotheses, probably none of the scholars could have predicted that an outsider and political newcomer like Jokowi could have so successfully challenged the political and economic establishment of Indonesia.
But Winters also highlights the effect of the scandalous corruption which allows even oligarchs with moderate means to “buy and distort the legal system, from the police and prosecutors up to the judges and politicians.” (p.19). Since variety and freedom of the media have been exposing these multiple “pathologies” and their undercutting of the reformasi gains, the voters have reacted the way they did on 9 July 2014 buy giving Jokowi a convincing majority over Prabowo and the oligarchs behind him.
But wait a minute, this simplified picture is too nice to be true. Jokowi is certainly not an oligarch, only a “minor millionaire” with assets of something between three and five million USD. The typical Indonesian shadow play (wayang) is hiding some rather interesting details about Jokowi’s election as Jakarta governor in 2012. Tempo magazine on 24 July of that year offered some juicy details of the funding behind candidacy and victory under the title “Who owns Jokowi?“. Prabowo, his oligarch brother Hashim Djojohadikusumo, ex-president Megawati Sukarnoputri, the Gerindra and PDI-P parties were involved, but also many grassroots organizations. Only at that time Prabowo could not imagine or foresee that Jokowi was to become a rival for the presidency. Winters has detailed background information on the oligarchic support for Jokowi in 2012 (p. 23 ff). As usual in politics everywhere, façade, perception, tactics and strategies make it difficult to see the reality. The office gives president Jokowi a chance to make himself more independent financially (in both meanings..) and to reduce oligarchic influence on his administration, but he must play his cards skilfully and ruthlessly.